Introduction
Last year saw another year of continued growth for the US economy. GDP expanded and the unemployment rate decreased to 5 percent in the last quarter of 2015, its lowest level since the beginning of 2008 and the start of the global financial crisis. The growth recovery and the decrease in unemployment led the Federal Reserve to change course and increase the federal funds rate in December 2015. This was the first increase in the federal funds rate in almost 10 years, and it carried the implicit expectation that there would be further tightening in the near future.
However, the current US recovery, now well into its seventh year, is like no other. The Federal
Reserve press release announcing the rate hike was extremely cautious, and many economistsincluding ourselves-have warned about the possibility of an extended period of secular stagnation. 1 Dissatisfaction with the performance of the US economy is dominating the 2016 presidential primaries: despite the relatively low 5 percent unemployment rate, the principal concern of voters and most of the candidates is "economy/jobs" (as it appears in the questionnaires of those conducting the various polls).
It is not hard to understand this dissatisfaction. This has been by far the slowest recovery in the postwar history of the United States. Compared to its precrisis peak in the fourth quarter of 2007, real GDP is only 11 percent higher (as of 2015Q4). Similarly, the number of employed civilian workers in December 2015 was only 3.3 million higher-representing an increase of 2.2 percent-than the corresponding employment level in November 2007, the peak of the previous cycle. Finally, the civilian-employment-to-population ratio is now only 1 percent higher than its 
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December 2014, and has since effectively stopped. The last time the employment-population ratio was at the current level was in April 1984.
In addition, the recent downturn in Brazil and Russia, the economic slowdown in China and the crash of the Chinese stock market (the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index is now 44 percent lower than it was last June), and, more generally, the fragile condition of the global economy-especially the economies of US trading partners-pose another challenge for the US economy and threaten the already anemic recovery.
The weak foreign demand for US exports is further dampened by the appreciation of the dollar. In the course of the last one and a half years, the broad trade-weighted nominal exchange rate of the dollar has appreciated more than 25
percent.
An important exception to the poor overall performance of net exports during the current recovery is the net export of petroleum products. The extraction of shale gas, together with the drop in the price of oil, has led to a very significant improvement in the trade of petroleum products. Shale gas extraction has also contributed to aggregate demand through investment. However, the benefits from the oil market downturn seem to have been exhausted. The price of oil is now so low that new shale gas projects are not profitable, and there is little room for improvement in the trade of petroleum products.
Moreover, there are indications that the instability in the financial markets can spread to the developed economies, even the United States. The last couple of months have witnessed significant drops in the stock markets of Europe and the New York Stock Exchange. Still, the S&P 500 Index is far above the levels of early 2000 and 2007, and it is hard to see how the "fundamentals" of the US economy justify that (in the same way that they did not then). However, we should not arrive at the hasty conclusion that the fragility of the US economy emanates from some exogenous shocks in foreign demand or the financial markets.
At its core, the US economy remains fragile because of three deeply rooted structural characteristics. The first is the weak performance of US net exports. Starting in the mid-1980s, but especially since the 1990s, there has been a successful invasion of American markets by foreign products, increasing imports This process is facilitated by asset inflation because rising asset prices make the balance sheets of debtors (and creditors) look better, enabling them to further increase borrowing and pushing debt-to-income ratios higher. Moreover, nominal increases in wealth also have a direct positive effect on consumption and aggregate demand. In that sense, the expansion of the 1990s was supported by the (hyper)inflated stock market of that period, and the expansion of the 2000s was supported by the recovery of the stock market together with the real estate market boom. Accordingly, the current recovery (weak as it is) has been supported by an extraordinary increase in stock prices. Therefore, a "correction" in the stock market will have a seriously negative impact on growth and employment.
The third serious structural problem in the US economy is the increase in income inequality over the last four decades, which has continued uninterrupted after the crisis. Besides the serious political ramifications it has, the increase in inequality also has dire macroeconomic consequences. The transfer of income shares from the middle class and lowerincome households toward households at the top of the income distribution is a serious drag on demand, since the saving rate of the latter is much higher than that of the former.
Moreover, the aforementioned increase in the debt-toincome ratio falls unevenly on households at the bottom of the distribution. In a previous report , we showed that the debt-to-income ratio of the household sector as a whole increased from 0.6 in the mid-1980s to 1.1 on the eve of the crisis in 2007. This already striking increase-related to the developments in the foreign sector and the fiscal stance of the government-was unequally divided between the bottom and the top of the distribution.
In the top 10 percent of the distribution the ratio remained virtually unchanged at a low level, fluctuating around 0.5, while households in the bottom 90 percent saw their debt-toincome ratio increase from 0.7 to 1.6 in 2007. This uneven distribution of debt has the dual effect of making the economy even more unstable while dampening aggregate demand when overindebted households try to deleverage in periods like the current recovery.
Thus, the fragile prospects for the US economy are not the result of some exogenous shock but are, rather, based on inherent characteristics of the economy and need to be primarily understood in terms of these three basic structural problems:
(1) weak foreign demand for US exports, (2) fiscal conservatism, and (3) income inequality. It is these structural problems that
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In the present report we discuss the state of the American economy and its prospects for the near future. We show that,
given the current configuration of the US and global economies, full employment in the United States will become increasingly dependent on an implausible rise in private sector indebtedness, especially household indebtedness. Such a process, even if it happens, cannot be sustained infinitely.
As always, we do not attempt to make short-run forecasts, and our simulations of the possible path of the US economy relate to the medium-and long-term future.
The Recovery So Far

GDP and Employment
The slow pace of the recovery can be understood with the help of Figure 1 , which depicts the path of real GDP from the trough to the peak of each post-WWII economic recovery, at quarterly frequency. Each line in the figure includes the trough of each business cycle recession-normalized to 100-and the peak of the subsequent recovery. The recession dates The gray lines correspond to the previous postwar recoveries. 2 It is important to keep in mind that by comparing the cycles from trough to peak and not from peak to peak we present a flattering picture of the current recovery, since the drop in income and employment during the downturn was sharper than in any other postwar cycle.
Two things stand out in Figure 1 . First, we note that the three most recent recoveries have been the shallowest in US postwar history. Second, the current recovery is the weakest of them all.
We notice the same picture in Figure 2 , which examines the recovery of the employment-to-population ratio over the postwar business cycles. Again, we see that the three latest recoveries have been the weakest in postwar history (with the exception of the cycle in the 1960s that traces the recovery of the 1990s). Most important, Figure 2 shows that in the latest two cycles, 25 quarters into the recovery-more than six years-the employment-to-population ratio had not recovered to the level it was at in the trough of the cycle. As we mentioned above, Figure 2 Moreover, as Figure 3 depicts, the recovery in labor productivity over the last six years has also been the slowest compared to all postwar business cycles. Indeed, compared to the fourth quarter of 2010, labor productivity has increased by only 2.6 percent. The sluggish growth in labor productivity has allowed unemployment to shrink despite the slow recovery of output. However, it signifies that the new jobs that have been created are largely low productivity and low paid.
Consumption, Inequality, and Debt
We can gain some further insights into the weak recovery if we break down GDP into its major components. Figure 4 Depression, and now is that in recent years income inequality has maintained its upward, precrisis trend.
The increase in the income share of households at the top of the distribution effectively meant that the average real income of the remaining 90 percent stagnated. As Figure 6 shows, the rapid increase in the average real income of households at the top in the period after 1980 was accompanied by stagnant average incomes for the remaining 90 percent. In fact, the average real income of households at the bottom of the distribution was lower in 2014 than in 1973.
Two more observations around Figure 6 are interesting.
As we could also infer from Figure (Berube and Holmes 2016) shows that inequality at the city and metropolitan level in the United States was also on the rise as of 2014.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the increase in inequality means a transfer of income from households with high propensity to consume to households with lower propensity to consume, and as a result dampens consumption. From this point of view, it is easy to understand the weak performance of consumption since 1990. Given this stagnating average income level of the majority of households, the performance of consumption should have been much worse. There were two factors that allowed consumption to increase at the pace it did. The first was the increase in the indebtedness of households. Figure 7 presents the household sector debt-to-disposable-income ratio for the period 1960-2015. It is no coincidence that the ratio was stable for the period before 1980, when inequality remained constant, and increased after 1980, when inequality started rising.
This increase in debt ratios was unevenly distributed among the households at the top and the bottom of the income distribution, with the households at the bottom recording the higher increases in their debt-to-income ratios.
In effect, lower-income and middle-class households increased their debt-to-income ratio in order to finance normal consumption expenditures in the face of stagnating incomes. 3 This increase in the debt-to-income ratio of the household sector was one of the main reasons behind the cri- A related factor that allowed for and sustained the increase in consumption was asset inflation. The period after 1980 and especially after 1990 was marked by rapidly increasing prices of stocks and real estate. Asset inflation has a positive impact on consumption through two different channels.
First, it hides the real vulnerability of highly indebted households (or firms) by inflating the asset side of their balance sheets.
As a result, the increase in the debt-to-income ratio of households did not seem that worrisome as long as the other side of their balance sheets was growing at a similar pace. Moreover, the increase in asset prices led to a large increase in the wealth of the households at the top of the distribution, boosting their consumption. Second, asset inflation made the balance sheets of financial institutions look better than they actually were, and sustained their willingness to increase lending.
In other words, in an economy where a rapid increase in indebtedness is a precondition for growth, high asset inflation becomes necessary to support the increase in indebtedness.
Thus, the increase in the debt-to-income ratio and asset price inflation are two sides of the same coin, of the same underlying process.
Under the current trend (or even the current level) of income inequality, a return to a "normal" rate of consumption growth would require another round of increases in the debtto-income ratio of households, especially those at the bottom of the distribution, and further inflation in asset markets to support the increasing indebtedness.
Investment
There are many economists who dismiss the significance of the distribution of income and inequality. For example, the American economist Robert Lucas famously wrote that, "Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution" (Lucas 2004 ).
The rationale behind this approach is that distribution is determined by technology (the productivity of the factors of production, etc.), and any attempt to change it creates distortions in the market that yield suboptimal economic results. If distribution is left to be determined by market forces, profits will increase and investment will boom, and, at the end of the day, this improvement in economic activity will "trickle down" to wage earners, rendering everyone better off. This rationale has dominated economic and political debates in the United States over the last 40 years, and has provided the intellectual consolidation not only has a negative impact on aggregate demand but also undermines the long-run prospects of the US economy.
Exports and Imports
The remaining components of GDP that need examination are those associated with the foreign sector, exports, and imports. Figure 12 presents the path of exports in the postwar recovery cycles. As shown, exports performed well during the initial phase of the current recovery, the result of dollar depreciation and the relatively high growth rates of the US trading partners at the time. However, as the recovery proceeded, the situation reversed: the dollar stopped depreciating in 2011 and started appreciating rapidly in 2014, while growth in many of the US trading partners subsided. As a result, whereas the performance of exports was on the high side in the first phase of postwar recovery cycles, it is now on the low side. As the figure shows, real exports have remained completely stagnant over the last year. As we will discuss below, the factors that have led to this stagnation are likely to intensify in the near future.
Finally, Figure 13 presents the postwar recoveries of imports. Notice that since imports have a negative impact on GDP, the higher the growth of imports, the lower the growth of GDP. What is striking in this figure is the very low increase in imports between 2011 and 2013. In the most recent period, imports have started rising again, but they are still below the level of all previous economic recoveries.
The relatively good performance of imports is obviously related to the relatively bad performance of GDP. Slow GDP growth created-all other things equal-slowly growing demand for imports. However, this improvement is also related to other factors, the most important being the development of new methods for extracting oil and gas (known as hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking"), which led to a very significant drop in the import of petroleum products.
The performance of the foreign sector of the US economy can be better understood with reference to Figure 14 , which presents the overall trade balance in goods and services and its decomposition into petroleum products, all other goods, and services. The figure allows us to draw the following conclusions:
1. The trade deficit of goods other than petroleum products has been increasing during the current recovery at the same pace as in the previous recovery cycle. It is now close to its historical peak. This surplus has since remained steady.
As mentioned above, the improvement in the balance of petroleum products is related to both the new extraction methods for shale gas that decreased the importation of oil and the collapse in oil prices over the last one and a half years:
it is now more than 70 percent lower than in June 2014. To understand the importance of this improvement we can compare the current trade balance with a counterfactual where the trade deficit of petroleum products would keep increasing along its pre-2011 trend. In this counterfactual scenario, the deficit in petroleum products would now be more than 3 percent of GDP-a difference of 2.5 percentage points compared to its actual current level. In this case, the overall trade deficit would have exceeded its precrisis peak.
This improvement in the trade balance of petroleum products is unlikely to continue, because the price of oil cannot go much lower than it already is; and even if it did, the margins for improvement would be small. In addition, at this low price level, the exploitation of new oil fields becomes unprofitable, as does the substitution of imported petroleum. It is indicative that real imports of petroleum products stopped falling in 2014Q3 and have even risen slightly since then. This is also evident from investment in "Mining exploration, shafts, and wells," which in 2015Q4 was less than half its level just a year ago.
If the balance of petroleum products does stop improving, the overall trade balance will follow the path of the "goods except petroleum products." It is already evident from Figures 11, 12, and 13 that the appreciation of the dollar, together with the weakening of growth of US trading partners relative to the United States exerts significant pressure on that balance. This pressure is bound to continue if these factors persist. We will come back to this issue later.
Asset Prices
As we mentioned earlier, the high levels of income inequality, large external deficits, and fiscal conservatism of the last three The problem with asset inflation-fueled expansions is that when the music stops-when asset prices stop rising or, even worse, fall-economic activity suffers. It is thus worth taking a closer look at the main asset markets in the United States. What about the equities market? Figure 15 shows that the S&P 500 Index has made a remarkable recovery over the last six years. Between 2009 and its peak last year the index increased by 270 percent, and it is now at historically high levels. Given the performance of the US economy over the same period, it is hard to justify this increase. Figure 17 , which normalize stock market prices to the earnings of firms and GDP. In the upper panel (Figure 17a ) we present the Shiller cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio.
This becomes clear with two other indices, shown in
The index shows that, adjusted for earnings, the valuation of the stock market is at precrisis levels, albeit lower than the levels it reached in the late 1990s. According to the other measure, which normalizes the market capitalization to GDP (Figure 17b ), we are now above the levels of the late 1990s.
These conclusions do not change even if we take into account 
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Note: The index is calculated as the ratio of the end-of-period Wilshire 5000 index to nominal GDP.
the recent market correction (at the time of this writing, on February 29, the S&P 500 Index was 5 percent below its peak level two months before).
In conclusion, looking at the stock and real estate markets, we notice that they are at (or near) historically high levels. This recovery in asset prices has certainly helped the economic recovery, which would have been much weaker had it not been for asset inflation. However, current asset market levels are hard to justify based on the "fundamentals," and it seems reasonable that-in the best-case scenario-the asset price inflation of the last six years will slow down or stop. In the worst case, the "correction" that began in January of this year will continue. Given the reliance of the US economy on asset prices, this will certainly have a serious negative impact on macroeconomic performance.
The Foreign Sector
In our last policy report, issued in the spring of last year , we stressed that one of the main factors that exert negative pressure on the US economy is weak foreign demand due to (1) the appreciation of the dollar and (2) the weak demand for US exports due to the slowdown in the economies of US trading partners.
To get an idea of the intensity of this pressure, we simu- In light of our projections last year, this comes as no surprise.
Is the situation bound to improve in the near-or medium-term future? The answer here is also, most probably, no. The economic prospects for Canada, the largest importer of US products, do not look encouraging. The drop in the price of oil has put a huge strain on the Canadian economy;
in 2013, exports of energy products accounted for one-quarter of the country's total exports. Moreover, the Canadian economy is threatened by a high level of household debt, which as of 2015Q3 had reached 165 percent of disposable income-higher than the precrisis-related ratio in the United
States. Finally, various measures show that the Canadian real estate market is overheated.
Moving south of the US border, the situation in Mexico, the second-largest importer of US goods, is not as dire, although the performance of the growth rate in 2015 was also one percentage point below the 3.5 percent forecast. This is still the highest growth rate since 2012. However, the industrial production index-probably the most important index for the state of the Mexican economy-shows signs of weakness. Mexico's economy is also vulnerable to the slowdown in Canada, the emerging markets, and the United States.
The eurozone is the third-largest destination for US exports. Figure 18a shows that, according to the IMF, the growth rate for 2015 was slightly higher (0.15 percent) than expected-based, however, on already very low expectations of only 1.35 percent. Besides these extremely low growth rates, 14 Strategic Analysis, March 2016
This global slowdown can affect US trade in three ways:
1. Through a decrease in the foreign demand for US exports because of lower GDP growth abroad.
2. Through the worsening of the US terms of trade, to the extent that lower GDP is accompanied by (or leads to) lower inflation abroad.
3. Through an appreciation of the dollar, due to either diverging monetary policy (e.g., between the Fed, the ECB, and the BoJ) or a reversal of the capital outflows of previous years, which kept the dollar at low levels.
Furthermore, there may be feedback effects among these.
For example, there are many developing countries with a large stock of debt denominated in US dollars. As the dollar appreciates, servicing this debt becomes more expensive, setting the stage for a crisis in these countries that then leads to further weakening of aggregate demand for US products. CBO 2014a CBO , 2014b CBO , 2015 , testifying to the significant downward pressures that the US economy is subject to.
According to the CBO, the main contributor to growth will be private consumption expenditure (1.8 percent and 1.9 percent of the total 2.7 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively, in the next two years), followed by business investment (0.6 percent and 0.5 percent), residential investment (0.4 percent in both years), and a small contribution by the government (0.2 percent). Net exports are thus projected to have a negative contribution to growth (-0.3 percent and -0.5 percent) .
At the same time, the CBO is projecting that the primary government deficit as a percentage of GDP will remain stable over the next five years. It also projects an increase in the overall deficit of roughly one percentage point over the same period, as a result of the increase in government interest payments due to the increase in US Treasury debt yields. For our simulations, we assume away this increase because (1) it is, in our opinion, unlikely that yields will increase, and (2) to the extent that this might happen, it is likely that there would be further government spending cuts at the state and local level.
In other words, our baseline scenario examines the conditions necessary for the general government deficit projected by the CBO to remain stable as a percentage of GDP, and for the US economy to grow with the pace projected by the CBO.
For our simulations we make assumptions that are as The results of our baseline simulations are presented in Figure 19 . What we see is that the slowdown in the economies of US trading partners, the appreciation of the dollar, and the exhaustion of the economic benefits of the petroleum sector lead to an increase in the current account deficit, which 
Other Scenarios: Destabilizing an Unstable Economy
Our baseline scenario shows that under its current structural characteristics the US economy is unstable, and that raising the private sector debt-to-income ratio to pre-2007 levels is a necessary requirement for achieving the growth rates projected by the CBO in the period 2016-20.
As we explained in the previous sections, this unstable configuration is further threatened by a possible weakening of economic activity abroad, further appreciation of the US dollar, and a drop in asset market prices that could also trigger a new round of private sector deleveraging. We evaluate these possibilities by simulating three additional scenarios. Moreover, in Figure 22 we see that the combination of lower foreign demand and deterioration in the terms of trade has a significant negative impact on the current account deficit, which reaches 8.7 percent of GDP in 2020, as opposed to 6.3 percent in the baseline. The slowdown will trigger automatic stabilizers, and thus the government deficit will increase, reaching 6.7 percent by 2020. These changes in the current account balance and the government deficit mean that the deficit of the private sector will also be higher. Figure   22 shows that by 2020 the private sector deficit converges to 2 percent, higher than the 1.5 percent in the baseline. Finally, as we can observe in Figure 20 , the debt-to-income ratios are higher in scenario 1 compared to the baseline since the private sector is assumed to accumulate debt as in the baseline, but the economic activity slows down.
In scenario 2 the nominal exchange rate, growth rate, and inflation rate of US trading partners revert to their baseline behavior. In this scenario it is assumed that the stock market continues to fall throughout 2016 and then stabilizes for the rest for the projection period. More precisely, the S&P 500
Index falls to around 1450 by the end of the year (comparable to precrisis levels in 2000 and 2007).
In addition, scenario 2 assumes that the private sectorpartly induced by the drop in the stock market-moves at the Figure 20 , the pace of the deleveraging is relatively slow and the debt-to-income ratios fall by 2020 to their early 2000s levels, which were already high by historical standards. 7 The effect of the stock market slide and-more important-the deleveraging of the private sector is shown in Figure   21 . The growth rate falls in 2017 to below 0.4 percent and remains at that level for the rest of the projection period. Figure 23 shows that the lower growth rate leads to a better current account balance compared to the baseline. On the other hand, deleveraging increases the private sector balance, which reaches 5.8 percent by the end of the projection period.
The fall in the growth rate leads to an increase in the government deficit, which reaches 7.8 percent in 2020, up from 5 percent in the baseline scenario.
Finally, in scenario 3 we assume that there is a combination of the negative factors in scenarios 1 and 2. The stock market fall and private sector deleveraging are accompanied by weaker growth abroad and an appreciation of the dollarunfortunately, not a far-fetched scenario. Figure 21 shows that this vicious alignment of adverse factors leads the growth rate into negative territory, around -0.7 percent in 2017 and -0.9 percent by the end of the projection period. In terms of the main sector balances, Figure 24 shows that the current account deficit increases only slightly, since the negative effects stemming from scenario 1 are counteracted by the lower demand for imports due to the lower growth rates. The private sector balance follows a trajectory similar to that in scenario 2, reaching 5.3 percent in 2020. As one would expect, the collapse in growth leads to an increase in the government deficit, which reaches 9.8 percent in 2020.
Conclusion
The weakness in many economies around the world and the turbulence in financial markets have induced many commentators to become cautious and warn about the possible risks these developments might have for the United States and global economies. We definitely agree with this position and have warned about these possible destabilizing factors in our previous reports.
However, as we explained above, it would be unwise to conclude that an otherwise robust and stable US economy is threatened solely by some exogenous shocks. The economy's instability is primarily structural, and is related to three main problems: (1) high income inequality, (2) high external deficits, and (3) the fiscal conservatism that-to paraphrase Keynes-has conquered Washington as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain. These fundamental structural characteristics make economic growth in the United States dependent on increasing indebtedness and asset market inflation, which as the recent experience has shown is a highly unstable process. It is this unstable configuration that is now being further destabilized by the weakening of foreign demand and the turbulence in asset markets. Therefore, achieving sustainable economic growth in the United States requires, first and foremost, addressing these fundamental issues: a decrease in income inequality, international cooperation to rebalance the global economy and improve the US external position, and relaxation of the government's fiscal stance. The alternative is a future of secular stagnation or debt-driven recoveries that will result in increasingly severe financial and economic crises.
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